Bruno Reynaud Sousa (Professor at School of Law of the University of Minho | JusGov Researcher in Space Law and Policy)
Introduction
During the 18th and 19th centuries, Great Britain’s undisputed dominance of the seas under Pax Britannica not only secured its economic and naval supremacy but also enabled it to export its legal norms worldwide.[1] British admiralty courts and jurists, backed by the Royal Navy’s enforcement power, set precedents in maritime law that other nations gradually adopted.[2] A notable example concerns landmark rulings by British courts in the late 18th century that established principles regarding neutral shipping rights and contraband, influencing international agreements such as the Declaration of Paris of 1856.[3] Indeed, the Declaration of Paris, recognised as the first multilateral law-making treaty, was a compromise in which Britain conceded wider neutral rights in exchange for the abolition of privateering. At the time, as privateering was central to U.S. naval strategy in the event of conflict with the former colonial power, Britain secured a diplomatic victory by pushing for the closure of most global ports to privateers, effectively ending the practice.[4]
In 1898, the Spanish-American War sparked a shift that eventually dethroned the Royal Navy’s supremacy and established the U.S. as the leading maritime power.[5] America’s quick victory and subsequent naval expansion – symbolised by steel battleships and the global cruise of the Great White Fleet[6] – transformed industrial might into blue-water reach and began a decades-long, peaceful transition from British to American dominance.[7]
A similar trend is apparent in 2025. The U.S. maintains unmatched military and commercial strength, from the Space Force’s expanding satellite constellations to SpaceX’s record-breaking launch rate and Starlink’s global network, even as China and Russia strive to narrow the gap. Just as economic power and innovation enabled the U.S. to establish maritime supremacy at the start of the twentieth century, these same forces now support American primacy in the newest strategic frontier – outer space.
Faced with the reality of American primacy in outer space, the EU prepared a layered response. The first layer leverages the so-called “Brussels Effect”[8] and rests upon enacting new EU law aimed at regulating space activities in the form of the proposed EU Space Act.[9] In essence, the belief in Brussels seems to be that by levelling the playing field and unlocking access to capital, a second layer of response will be unleashed: a competitive internal market capable of delivering innovation at speed and scale in space technologies.
The third space age is U.S.-led
For the past decade, the U.S. has initiated a commercial space revolution, leading in both scale and technological innovation. Underwritten by commercialisation, the increase in U.S.-licensed satellites, especially small satellites, has rapidly expanded the global satellite count, ushering in the so-called “third space age.”[10]
Data from 2025 indicate that the total number of active satellites is approximately 11,000 objects, according to the European Space Agency (ESA).[11] Data from multiple sources indicate that over 8,500 active satellites are owned or operated by US-based companies,[12] representing more than three-quarters of the total. This number is an order of magnitude greater than that of the next closest competitor: Russia has approximately 1,500 satellites, and China has about 900 satellites.[13] Other spacefaring countries, such as India and Japan, each operate only a few hundred or fewer satellites,[14] highlighting the relatively small scale of their space activities compared to leading space-faring nations.
The EU Member States supervise only a few hundred active satellites – a small fraction of the total number of satellites under U.S. jurisdiction.[15] In terms of raw numbers and global coverage, particularly in sectors such as telecommunications and Earth observation, the U.S. satellite constellations are unmatched. The most notable example is SpaceX’s Starlink, a mega-constellation for broadband internet that presently comprises more than 7,400 operational satellites,[16] making up nearly half of all active satellites globally.
It is often forgotten that the Space Shuttle itself was reusable. Yet, in 2015, SpaceX not only marked the restart of launcher reusability but did so at a higher degree of efficiency. The ORBCOMM-2 mission was the first to successfully return a Falcon-9 rocket’s first stage to Earth, proving a technology that guaranteed a significant reduction in launch costs as well as a higher launch frequency, thereby supporting U.S. leadership in launch capacity.[17] In the period 2015-2024, ca. 12,600 small satellites were launched worldwide[18], with about 75% of all small satellites launched since 2015 being U.S. missions,[19] largely due to the successful operation of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy rockets.[20] In 2024, the U.S. carried out substantially more orbital launches than any other country, with U.S. operators executing 145 of the 258 worldwide launches, more than twice as many as China’s 66 and significantly more than Russia’s 17 launches.[21]
SpaceX’s dominance is so marked that out of 145 U.S. launches, 138 were by SpaceX alone,[22] contrasting with only three launches of European-made rockets in 2024, two attributed to France and one to ESA.[23] However, SpaceX is far from a monopoly status beyond Starlink payloads: based on a total of ca. 11,300 satellites successfully reaching orbit in the years 2020-2024,[24] 26%-30% (corresponding to ca. 3,000-3,400) were not launched by SpaceX.
Data for September 2025 indicates that the US conducted over 100 launches, followed by 44 by China, nine by Russia, and four attributed to France.[25] These figures highlight the US’s leadership in launch capability, supported by technology that competitors are only beginning to develop, with reusability so far eluding other companies,[26] as Europe’s next-generation Ariane 6 rocket and Japan’s H3 remain expendable, and China is still testing partial reusability concepts.[27]
A key aspect is whether large satellite constellations might remain the preferred option for mission architecture. In turn, large satellite constellations are dependent upon a guaranteed high launch rate. Should launch rates increase, fixed costs will be spread over a broader cost base, and the price per launch will necessarily be lower. In this scenario, reliance on U.S.-based infrastructure and services to meet civil, commercial, and security needs is likely to grow.
European reliance brought to light significant strategic consequences, as demonstrated by the war in Ukraine: if U.S.-based commercial firms provide the backbone of space-based services for other nations – particularly during wartime – such dominance creates a complex strategic environment.
Furthermore, there are natural consequences at the national security and defence level. Firstly, in 2019, the U.S. became the first NATO member state to create a branch of the armed forces dedicated to the space domain: the United States Space Force.[28] This policy decision has since been mirrored by European NATO countries, either by renaming an existing branch of the armed forces (e.g., France, the Netherlands, and Spain) or by creating a new command structure (e.g. Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy).
Secondly, as in the past, space assets may be leveraged for so-called gunboat diplomacy in space, whereby “[t]he limited use of space forces may be combined with diplomatic pressure to affect the internal or external affairs of a competitor.”[29] Finally, taking into account that privateers and pirates are historically “two aspects of naval irregular warfare”,[30] one cannot exclude the appearance of such non-state actors as commercial space activities consolidate, also keeping in mind that “what is and is not a commercial space entity is currently elusive”[31] – especially with reference to China’s space sector.
Finally, leveraging its “first-mover advantage”,[32] there is the decision to develop a “next-generation missile defence shield”.[33] Under U.S. Presidential Executive Order 14186 titled “The Iron Dome for America”,[34] the U.S. Secretary of War is directed to develop and implement a comprehensive missile defence architecture, including space-based sensors, interceptors, and integrated systems to counter hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missile threats.[35] Subsequently renamed “The Golden Dome for America”, the project innovatively foresees the “[d]evelopment and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors capable of boost-phase intercept.”[36] Although the final characteristics of the architecture are yet unknown, preliminary scholarly considerations suggest that the deployment of the Golden Dome could accelerate space weaponisation and stimulate debate with reference to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST).[37]
Much like the Strategic Defence Initiative of the 1980s, Golden Dome’s reliance on space-based technologies could face insurmountable feasibility issues against modern hypersonic threats, as well as scalability challenges, including the vast geographical scope, advanced adversary countermeasures, and prohibitive costs, which would likely result in limited operational success.[38] Nonetheless, the U.S. is uncontestably the only space power capable of seriously considering the development of a project of the foreseen magnitude, largely thanks to the success of commercialisation.
The EU Space Act: enabling strategic autonomy?
At its heart, the EU Space Act aligns with the current European Zeitgeist of strategic autonomy and aims to level the legal playing field across the Union. The EU Commission’s approach is fully aligned with the measures aimed at renewing the European Industrial and Technological Defence Base (EITDB) with a view to delivering strategic autonomy while narrowing the transatlantic gap regarding military capabilities.
At present, EU-based space activities are governed by a patchwork of legal regimes: less than half of EU Member States have enacted national space legislation.[39] This fragmentation is viewed as a competitive disadvantage, warranting EU law intervention to level the playing field in an ecosystem where small and medium-sized enterprises coexist with large system integrators in the aerospace and defence sector.[40] Therefore, by establishing common standards for licensing, insurance, liability, debris mitigation, and related areas, the EU is implementing its historical strategy of attempting to eliminate internal barriers, resulting in a single set of rules across all Member States.[41]
While the Act is framed around fair competition and sustainability, its underlying message is clear: protect Europe’s space sector from being reduced to a second-tier industry. Regardless of this intention, the reality is that, absent the changes introduced by the EU Parliament, the EU Space Act will not fully and decisively implement the recommendations of the Draghi report regarding competitiveness.[42]
Overall, the Space Act is as much about internal consolidation – aimed at increasing efficiency and scale – as it is about geopolitics. In essence, the Brussels’ point of view is that the draft regulation is (1) a necessary response to a perceived chaotic “Wild West” scenario and (2) a way to ensure Europe remains a co-creator of the rules governing the final frontier – both warrant additional scrutiny.
Firstly, the popular image of a lawless “Wild West” overlooks how commercial activities were pursued through U.S. courts, locally codified mining and ranching regulations, and powerful trade associations. Briefly, applying the metaphor to space activities is misleading: the expansion to the West was characterised by light regulation but meaningfully disciplined by U.S. courts and enforceable customs. One key example concerns the principle of free mining and the customs, uses and regulations of mining districts, whereby “all valuable mineral deposits […] shall be free and open to exploration and purchase […] according to the local customs or rules of miners.”[43]
Secondly, there is the matter of ascertaining how much “skin” – a degree of strategic autonomy and/or meaningful partnerships with the U.S. – the EU will have in “the game” of commercial space activities in LEO, given the widening innovation gap detailed above.
Fork in the road: the road to 2030 and the price of divergence
The current transatlantic tensions may perhaps be at a lower point than twenty years ago, when Robert Kagan concluded that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus”, agreeing on “little and understanding one another less and less.”[44] In the wake of the most recent EU-US tensions on trade and Ukraine, few would dispute the fact that transatlantic relations could soon be beyond the “Mars and Venus” paradigm, evoking two different solar systems.
Europe’s greatest fear in this scenario would be marginalisation, as EU Member States risk being increasingly seen as customers of the US instead of allies, especially at a time when the Union seeks to remilitarize while addressing energy dependency from Russia and making commercial overtures to China. Transatlantic relations are at a critical juncture, and the space domain will either continue to be a key area of transatlantic cooperation or become a novel source of trade irritants. The U.S., with its dominant position in commercial space activities, possesses both the capability and the intention to shape the emerging space order through its technological and market leadership. One key example: whereas the EU Space Act is strong on sustainability, the recent U.S. Presidential Executive Order 14335[45] sent a strong signal that the current Administration wants to deregulate environmental oversight, especially for commercial space launches, reentries, and spaceport infrastructure.
The Space Act draft attempts to align with calls for a European commitment to competitiveness, aptly detailed in the Draghi report[46] and also in the Letta report.[47] The EU Commission, perhaps recognising the substantial innovation gap and the decreasing resilience of the single market, is decisively promoting its own vision for space commercialisation by doubling down on regulatory activism. The next decade could likely see the consolidation of U.S. primacy in space, as China continues to rise, leaving Europe either aligned with the U.S. or attempting to chart its own course. Conversely, a more balanced and collaboratively managed transatlantic approach to space activities could also succeed, preserving the long-standing alliance in a domain that is becoming increasingly vital to all aspects of society. A perceived lack of policy is often just a lack of leadership.
The EU Space Act has not yet been finalised, and its implementation is not expected until 2030. Given the rapid pace of innovation in space technologies, it is only speculation to predict what the global space market will look like in five years. Larger political shifts could increase this estrangement, potentially leading to a future scenario where a US administration is less willing to engage in constructive dialogue with allies through established platforms – namely, the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD), and most recently, the Trade and Technology Council (TTC).
At the same time, the EU could adopt a more assertive stance and decisively push for a strategy for autonomy with concrete actions beyond financial mechanisms. The result may be a split system, characterised by regulatory fragmentation, where a satellite might require separate approvals under U.S. and EU regulations, each emphasising different priorities. Politically, if left unresolved, the issue could become another irritant in EU-U.S. relations, potentially affecting cooperation in adjacent areas. Most worryingly, some EU Member States may be unwilling to pay the price of divergence with the U.S., especially if EU policies under President Ursula Von der Leyen fail to deliver strategic autonomy. The outcome would likely result in fragmented transatlantic relations, a diminished role for the EU, and increased misalignment among Member States with an entrenched EU Commission.
[1] James Morris, Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980).
[2] Morris, Pax Britannica.
[3] Declaration Respecting Maritime Law of 16 April 1856, signed at Paris, France (United Kingdom, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, Turkey).
[4] Jan Martin Lemnitzer, “‘That Moral League of Nations against the United States’: The Origins of the 1856 Declaration of Paris,” The International History Review 35, no. 5 (2013): 1068–88, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.844194.
[5] Stephen Kinzer, The True Flag: Theodore Roosevelt, Mark Twain, and the Birth of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2017).
[6] Ilani Nurick, “The Return of the Roosevelt Doctrine: How History Can Inform American Naval Policy in the Pacific Theater,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, December 11, 2024, https://www.yalejournal.org/publications/the-return-of-the-roosevelt-doctrine-how-history-can-inform-american-naval-policy-in-the-pacific-theater.
[7] Kinzer, The True Flag.
[8] A Bradford, “The Brussels Effect”, Northwestern University Law Review, 107(1) (2012): 1-68. (Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 533). Retrieved 27 September 2025 from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2770634.
[9] European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the European Council on the Safety, Resilience and Sustainability of Space Activities in the Union – COM(2025) 335 Final – 2025/0335 (COD),” June 25, 2025.
[10] T. Harrison, “Building an enduring advantage in the third space age”, American Enterprise Institute, May 2024. Retrieved 27 September 2025 from https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Building-an-Enduring-Advantage-in-the-Third-Space-Age.pdf.
[11] “ESA Space Environment Report 2025,” European Space Agency, last modified April 1, 2025, https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Space_Debris/ESA_Space_Environment_Report_2025.
[12] “Smallsats by the Numbers 2025 – a Report on Global Small Satellite Activity from 2015 to 2024,” BryceTech, accessed July 1, 2025, https://brycetech.com/reports/report-documents/smallsats-2025; “UCS Satellite Database”, Union of Concerned Scientists, last modified May 1, 2023, https://www.ucs.org/resources/satellite-database; “Understanding the Third Space Age” ; “Space Statistics | Jonathan’s Space Report,”, J. McDowell, accessed August 31, 2025, https://planet4589.org/space/stats/index.html.
[13] “Space Statistics | Jonathan’s Space Report”; “Smallsats by the Numbers 2025 – a Report on Global Small Satellite Activity from 2015 to 2024”; Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Satellite Database.”
[14] McDowell, “Space Statistics | Jonathan’s Space Report.”
[15] European Commission, “Commission SWD Impact Assessment Report Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Safety, Resilience and Sustainability of Space Activities in the Union – SWD(2025) 335 Final – Part I,” June 25, 2025.
[16] McDowell, “Starlink Statistics | Jonathan’s Space Report.”, accessed September 27, 2025, https://planet4589.org/space/con/star/stats.html, last modified Sep 26, 2025.
[17] “Global Space Launch Activity in 2024.”
[18] BryceTech, Smallsats by the Numbers 2025 — a report on global small satellite activity from 2015 to 2024, 2025. Retrieved 31 August 2025 from https://brycetech.com/reports/report-documents/smallsats-2025/
[19] “Global Space Launch Activity in 2024.”
[20] “Launches (Official Launch Manifest and Schedule).”
[21] “Space Statistics | Jonathan’s Space Report.”
[22] “Space Statistics | Jonathan’s Space Report.”
[23] “Space Statistics | Jonathan’s Space Report.”
[24] “Space Statistics | Jonathan’s Space Report.”
[25] “Space Statistics | Jonathan’s Space Report.”
[26] Jeff Foust, “Expending the Expendables: More Launch Companies Are Betting Their Future on Reusability,” SpaceNews, November 11, 2024, https://spacenews.com/expending-expendables-more-launch-companies-betting-their-future-reusability/.
[27] Andrew Jones, “China Is about to Start Trying to Land and Reuse Its Rockets,” SpaceNews, August 25, 2025, https://spacenews.com/china-is-about-to-start-trying-to-land-and-reuse-its-rockets/; Andrew Jones, “New Rocket Plans Continue to Emerge to Support China’s Growing Space Ambitions,” SpaceNews, August 22, 2025, https://spacenews.com/new-rocket-plans-continue-to-emerge-to-support-chinas-growing-space-ambitions/.
[28] The White House, “Space Policy Directive-4: Establishment of the United States Space Force”, last modified February 19, 2019, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/text-space-policy-directive-4-establishment-united-states-space-force/.
[29] John J. Klein, Understanding Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space, Space Power and Politics (Oxfordshire: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 72.
[30] Klein, Understanding Space Strategy, 127.
[31] Klein, Understanding Space Strategy, 119.
[32] Bruce McClintock, et al., First Mover Typology for the Space Domain: Building a Foundation for Future Analysis (RAND Corporation, 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2208-1.html.
[33] The White House, “Executive Order 14186 – The Iron Dome for America,” January 27, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/the-iron-dome-for-america/.
[34] The White House, “The Iron Dome for America.”
[35] The White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Directs the Building of the Iron Dome Missile Defense Shield for America,” February 27, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/01/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-directs-the-building-of-the-iron-dome-missile-defense-shield-for-america/.
[36] The White House, “The Iron Dome for America.”
[37] Pranay R. Vaddi and John K. Warden, “Golden Dome and Arms Control: Impediment or Opportunity?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 81, no. 4 (2025): 296–304, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2025.2518872.
[38] Steve Fetter and David Wright, “Can the Iron Dome Be Transmuted into a Golden Dome?,” The Washington Quarterly 48, no. 2 (2025): 95–114, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2025.2514916.
[39] European Commission, “Commission SWD Impact Assessment Report Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Safety, Resilience and Sustainability of Space Activities in the Union – Part II,” June 25, 2025.
[40] European Commission, “Impact Assessment Report on Space Activities in the Union – Part I.”
[41] European Commission, “Impact Assessment Report on Space Activities in the Union – Part I.”
[42] M. Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe, including “In-Depth Analysis and Recommendations” (Part B), European Commission, 2024. Retrieved 31 August 2025 from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en.
[43] 30 U.S.C. § 22 (“Mineral Lands and Regulations In General – Mineral Lands Open to Purchase by Citizens”). See Rinehart v. California, 377 P.3d 818 (Cal. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 635 (2018).
[44] Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, no. 113 (2002): 3–28.
[45] D. J. Trump, Executive Order 14335: Enabling competition in the commercial space industry.: Federal Register / U.S. Government Printing Office, 2025.
[46] M. Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe, including “In-Depth Analysis and Recommendations” (Part B). European Commission, 2024. Retrieved 31 August 2025 from https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en.
[47] E. Letta, Much more than a market: Speed, Security, Solidarity – Report on the Future of the Single Market, 2024. European Commission / Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf.
Picture credit: by Pixabay on pexels.com.
Author: UNIO-EU Law Journal (Source: https://officialblogofunio.com/2025/09/30/the-brussels-effect-in-orbit-can-the-eu-space-act-reshape-global-space-governance-in-an-american-led-era/)
