Editorial of December 2025

On the ailing transatlantic partnership and its impact on European integration 

Alessandra Silveira [Editor of this blog, Coordinator of Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence “Digital Citizenship and Technological Sustainability” (CitDig), University of Minho] and Pedro Froufe [Editor of this blog and Coordinator of the Group “Studies in European Union Law” (CEDU), of JUSGOV – Research Centre for Justice and Governance, University of Minho)]

The US National Security Strategy, presented at the beginning of December,^[1] is an official State Department document that sets out the fundamental guidelines for US diplomacy – in other words, it defines how the US will relate to the rest of the world over the next three years. The US National Security Strategy has been taken seriously over time – and in this text we will assume that we still live in a world where there are adults in the room, despite the volatility of the ideas put forward within the Trump Administration.^[2]  

What is the relevance of this new US Strategy for the world order?  The general feeling is that, if taken seriously, this Strategy reconfigures the concept of sovereignty in the 21st century.^[3] In other words, the Strategy officially recognises the existence of zones of vital interest, which the strongest states can naturally dispose of – a kind of division of the world into zones of influence. This would justify the prominence of the US in the so-called “Western Hemisphere”, as well as US access to strategically vital assets – wherever they may exist in the “Western Hemisphere”.

This suggests a revival of the old thesis of “living space” (“Lebensraum”) adopted and amplified with tragic consequences for all of humanity by Nazi Germany’s Third Reich.[4]  This is a geopolitical concept popularised in the 19th century by Friedrich Ratzel and taken up again in the 20th century by Karl Haushofer – whose ideas were exploited and used by the Third Reich. This idea of the indispensability of “living space” was also detected in Vladimir Putin’s narrative, especially in his justifications (at least in his initial ones) for the invasion of Ukraine by the forces of the Russian Federation.

The Strategy seems anchored in the 19th-century worldview of the post-Napoleonic era’s “Concert of Europe”. The “Concert of Europe” was the system of balance of power that existed in Europe from the end of the Napoleonic Wars, i.e. from 1815 to 1914, when the First World War broke out. It was a vision of international order and law based on the strength of powers and the mutual management and respect of their respective interests. An order based on military power and a balance/peace resulting from circumstantial interests and power relations – although it proved to be relatively stable until the First World War.

Moreover, part of the narrative expressed by the Trump Administration clearly refers to a vision of an “American-centric” international order, supported by arguments based not on international law or cooperation, but on the use of force. Examples include Panama and, currently, Venezuela. Previously, there was the case of Greenland and threats to Denmark. According to the logic of the “Concert of Europe”, one can understand the “deference” that President Trump has shown towards the positions/interests of the Russian Federation in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Why is the US National Security Strategy particularly relevant to Europe? It is so because Europe is part of the “Western Hemisphere”, and the Strategy states that the US cannot simply discard Europe, as doing so would be counterproductive to the goals of “American prosperity”. So, what will the US do with Europe without discarding it? It will force Europe to correct its current trajectory by interfering in European elections and domestic politics. More specifically, it will encourage so-called European “patriotic parties” (i.e., Eurosceptic and populist parties) to cultivate “resistance to Europe’s current trajectory”. This hybrid threat of interference in European democracy is openly acknowledged in the Strategy.

But what exactly is wrong with Europe that needs to be corrected by the US? According to the Trump Administration, Europe is at risk of “civilizational erasure” due to the policies adopted by European institutions. And why? Because the European Union is undermining the political sovereignty of its Member States; it is promoting censorship of freedom of expression; it is repressing political opposition from “patriotic parties”; migration policies are transforming the European continent and creating conflicts; and falling birth rates are leading to the loss of national identities.

Furthermore, the Strategy uses the term “European Union” only once, while referring to the word “Europe” 49 times. In terms of discourse analysis, this is not a mere detail, as it reveals that the European Union is a target to be taken down by the Trump Administration. What the US wants is a Europe of nations, a Europe that abandons “its failed focus on regulatory suffocation”.

Faced with this unsolicited diagnosis, the European institutions had to react, which is why the President of the European Council, António Costa, stated that the European Union will not tolerate political interference from the US. According to António Costa, Washington cannot choose, on behalf of European citizens, which policies are correct or which ones they should vote for.^[5]

The relevant question in this scenario was raised a few days ago by Jürgen Habermas: can the European Union still escape the authoritarian influence of the US? What does this undeniable political division in the West mean for the European Union today, given that the Trump Administration has ceased to be a reliable partner? The problem is that the European Union cannot yet distance itself politically from the passive NATO member that the US has become. Even though Americans and Europeans no longer speak with one Western voice, the European Union remains dependent on American technological support, mainly because without it the Ukrainian front could not be maintained. Faced with this dilemma, the only reasonable solution for Europeans would be to unite if they do not want to face marginalisation.^[6]

This unity requires deepening the federative components of integration. The diagnosis has already been made and now demands political choices. It is important to complete the internal market in areas that are still nationalised; it is important to create commercial scale where it does not yet exist; it is important to reduce bureaucracy to allow the market to function; it is important to keep talent and investment within the European Union. However, it is important to do so without abandoning the fundamental European values that identify it – dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, democracy, the rule of law – because without these, the European Union does not exist as such.

If we want to see the glass as half full, the Trump Administration’s Strategy could become a catalyst for European strategic unity and sovereignty; if we want to see the glass as half empty, it widens the divide in European societies because it provides external validation to Eurosceptic and populist parties. But Europeans have been able to live with this division, as they are accustomed to pluralism and polarisation in democratic societies, provided that the institutional conditions for the alternation of power survive.

Political tension between the US and the European Union escalated during December 2025 because the European Commission imposed a €120 million fine on Elon Musk’s social media platform X for violating transparency rules under European law – something Musk can challenge in European courts, as the European Union he wants to dismantle is still a Union of law. Following that financial penalty, the US threatened the European Union with retaliation if it did not review its “discriminatory” regulations in the digital sector – which, according to Washington, were unfairly punishing large US technology companies.

However, European regulations apply to all agents who may engage in acts and/or omissions that fall within their material scope of application. They are not aimed solely at US companies – but at all companies!

Recently, the US Secretary of Commerce went to Brussels to propose a 50% reduction in tariffs on European steel and aluminium if the European Union agreed to deregulate the digital sector.^[7] Moreover, for some time now, this pressure from the US has been contaminating the moderate right wing of the European Parliament – which supports the von der Leyen Commission – even though the European Commission’s official line has always been not to give in to US pressure for deregulation.

However, in practice, worrying signs have emerged. President Ursula von der Leyen, in her speech at the Copenhagen Competitiveness Summit on 1 October, reported that the European Commission has several legislative packages in the pipeline – dubbed “omnibus” and focusing on the green and digital transitions^[8] – which would represent a reduction of €8 billion in bureaucracy. This would certainly be good news if, for the first time publicly, the President of the European Commission had not admitted that “simplification” effectively means “deregulation”.^[9] The European Union Ombudsman harshly criticised the Commission for procedural flaws in proposing the omnibus measures, stating that they amounted to maladministration, as the Commission had not followed due process in drawing up a plan to reduce bureaucracy.^[10] 

Along the same lines, high-ranking officials from the European Commission have been publicly arguing that the supposed reduction in bureaucracy is creating uncertainty for businesses and chaos in European institutions. It is certainly important to avoid duplication of effort, to align procedures, to streamline processes, and to provide greater clarity to businesses. But one cannot go too far, because deregulation eliminates the protection of individuals online, increases costs for taxpayers, diminishes credibility in the European market, discourages investment – and, above all, widens inequalities and distortions.^[11] It is possible that they are interpreting the Draghi report too literally.  

In a Union that claims to be based on the rule of law, simplifying the rules is not the same as weakening protection or abandoning regulation^[12] – especially since this undermines European standards and damages confidence in the so-called “Brussels effect”. The European Union’s ability to influence other parts of the world, by regulating the ecological and digital transitions in a way that makes them fair, is compromised if the rest of the world concludes that Europeans have failed after all. Furthermore, the entire post-pandemic economic recovery in Europe is based on properly regulated ecological and digital transitions. Moreover, the Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) resources can only be used to ensure both transitions. What will become of this approach?

There is no doubt that we are facing challenges so disruptive that they cause some confusion among our elected representatives. It is not easy to confront those “patriotic parties” – which use scandal and incitement to hatred as a political strategy. It is no small feat to combat Putin’s military threat – with daily cyberattacks and drones invading EU airspace. It is not easy to remain competitive in an unequal technological race – since our competitors ignore our high standards of fundamental rights protection. However, it is precisely in the face of these challenges that it is important not to lose sight of what unites us, the history and objectives underlying the European Union, and the fact that our future is more promising together.

Regulation and innovation are not antagonistic – they are complementary. It is not because Europeans regulate the digital ecosystem that they are not at the forefront of AI innovation. The reason for this is that there is currently more investment available in the US for such purposes.[13] Here too, it is essential to complete the internal market so that capital can circulate without national barriers and private savings can be mobilised for innovation through the integration of European capital markets.

[1] The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, November 2025, Washington, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.

[2] Nahal Toosi, “Trump reveals what he wants for the world”, Politico, 12 May 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/12/05/trump-reveals-national-security-strategy-western-hemisphere-europe-00678265.

[3] Armando Júnior, “Nova estratégia de segurança nacional dos EUA reconfigura o conceito de soberania no século XXI”, The Conversation, 15 December 2025, https://theconversation.com/nova-estrategia-de-seguranca-nacional-dos-eua-reconfigura-o-conceito-de-soberania-no-seculo-xxi-271794.

[4] Pedro Madeira Froufe, “Editorial of March 2022 – Europe and War”, The Official Blog of UNIO – Thinking and Debating Europe, 9 March 2022, https://officialblogofunio.com/2022/03/09/editorial-of-march-2022/.

[5] Sandor Zsiros and Maria Tadeo, “Council President António Costa says Europe will not accept political interference in US rebuff”, Euronews, 8 December 2025, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/12/08/council-president-antonio-costa-says-europe-will-not-accept-political-interference-in-us-r.

[6] Jürgen Habermas, “Can the EU still escape the authoritarian pull of the USA?”, Social Europe,
15 December 2025, https://www.socialeurope.eu/can-the-eu-still-escape-the-authoritarian-pull-of-the-usa.

[7] Peggy Corlin, “US to cut steel tariffs only if EU agrees to soften digital rules enforcement in return”, 24 November 2025, Euronews, https://www.euronews.com/business/2025/11/24/us-to-cut-steel-tariffs-only-if-eu-agrees-to-soften-digital-rules-enforcement-in-return.

[8] European Council, Council of the European Union, “Simplification of EU rules – Omnibus packages”, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pt/policies/simplification/#omnibus.

[9] European Commission, “Speech by President von der Leyen at the Copenhagen Competitiveness Summit”, 1 October 2025, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_2272.

[10] Marianne Gros, “EU watchdog slams Commission over red-tape cutting workflow”, Politico, 27 November 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-watchdog-accuses-commission-of-maladministration-in-lawmaking-process/.

[11] Francesca Micheletti, “Red-tape cutting has become a ‘terrible political spectacle,’ EU’s Ribera says”, Politico, 4 December 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-red-tape-cutting-terrible-political-spectacle-teresa-ribera-says/.

[12] Romane Armangau, “EU must ‘stand by the promises made’ on digital rules, Vestager tells Euronews”, Politico, 25 November 2025, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/11/25/eu-must-stand-by-the-promises-made-on-digital-rules-vestager-tells-euronews.

[13] Calder McHugh, “Why AI is a nightmare for the EU”, Politico, 17 December 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/artificial-intelligence-regulation-europe-united-states/.

Picture credit: by Andrea Piacquadio on pexels.com.